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Abstract 
 
This paper critically assesses the EU’s anti-piracy operation Atalanta in the light of 
the protection of Union citizens. The main question is to which extent a Union citizen 
threatened by pirates off the coast of Somalia could rely on the promise of civis europaeus 
sum. The paper discusses the various legal aspects pertaining to the forceful protection of 
EU citizens in international law, EU constitutional law and the operational parameters of 
Atalanta. It argues that within the particular framework of the international effort to 
combat piracy, the protection of citizens by military force could be legal. Moreover, the 
protection of citizens outside the EU forms now one of the legally-binding general 
objectives of the Union. Yet, this objective is not reiterated in the operational mandate, 
which creates tension and confusion between the general objective and the CSDP 
instrument. The paper concludes that the mandate of Atalanta, by focussing entirely on 
universal objectives, is constitutionally incomplete and shows that the external dimension 
of Union citizenship is still underdeveloped. 
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1. Introduction: The civis europaeus and the hostis humani generis 
The ancient Roman dictum ‘civis romanus sum’,I a pledge of respect for one’s rights as 
a Roman citizen, has remained a powerful concept throughout the centuries. Importantly, 
the status that it indicates was not just relevant within the Roman Empire, but also carried 
considerable weight beyond its borders, instilling fear in the ‘barbarians’ that mistreating a 
Roman would be answered with severe reprisals. It is this external dimension of citizen 
protection with which the present contribution is concerned in the context of the 
European Union, with particular regard to its Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) as exemplified through the anti-piracy operation Atalanta. 
In the modern age, the phrase resurfaced in the context of protecting a nation-
state’s citizens aboard. As one of the most (in)famous examples, Lord Palmerston evoked 
in a speech before the British House of Commons in 1850 ‘the sense of duty which has led 
us to think ourselves bound to afford protection to our fellow subjects abroad’ 
(reproduced in Francis 1852: 496). Consequently, according to Palmerston,   
‘as the Roman, in days of old, held himself free from indignity, when he could say Civis 
Romanus sum; so also a British subject, in whatever land he may be, shall feel confident 
that the watchful eye and the strong arm of England, will protect him against injustice and 
wrong.’ (reproduced in Francis 1852: 496).  
Similarly, even though in more aggressive terms, in 1900 Kaiser Wilhelm II told his 
troops at Bremerhaven (in a speech that would later by known as the “Hunnenrede”), before 
sending them off to China to quell the Boxer Rebellion that ‘by its character the German 
Empire has the obligation to provide help to its citizens whenever they are oppressed 
abroad’ (my translation, original reproduced in Görtemaker 1996: 357). Consequently, in 
order to avenge the alleged breaches of international law committed by the Chinese, the 
Kaiser instructed his troops to handle their arms in such a way that ‘for a thousand years no 
Chinese will dare even to squint at a German anymore’ (my translation, original reproduced 
in Görtemaker 1996: 357; for other historical examples see Ianniello Saliceti, 2011: 91-92). 
Already here, it becomes obvious that there are two sides to the concept. Next to the as 
such laudable idea of the state extending its protection over its citizens wherever they may 
be to shield them from harm, there is also the negative connotation of disregard for other 
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countries’ sovereignty, as ‘a pretext for intervention’ (Gray 2008: 159) and generally a sign 
of ‘imperialism’, especially when the use of force is involved. 
Also in the context of the European Union the ancient adage has been drawn upon. 
Four Advocates General have used the expression ‘civis europeus [sic] sum’.II According to 
Advocate General Jacobs, who originally introduced the phrase into the vocabulary of the 
European Court of Justice, a Union citizen is ‘entitled to assume that, wherever he goes to 
earn his living in the European Community, he will be treated in accordance with a 
common code of fundamental values […]’.III However, civis europaeus sum in these cases 
concerned the invocation of fundamental rights by Union citizens within the EU. The 
protection of Union citizens abroad is a matter distinct from the legal momentum behind 
consolidation and incorporation of citizens’ rights protection inside the Union’s borders.IV  
Still, the introduction of Union citizenship into the primary law by the Maastricht Treaty 
already included an explicit external component, viz. the protection by the diplomatic or 
consular authorities of any Member State in third countries for Union citizens whose 
Member State is not represented (Art. 8c TEU (Maastricht Treaty version); for the post-
Lisbon provision, Art. 23 TFEU; see also Art. 46 Charter of Fundamental Rights). Apart 
from consular and diplomatic protection proper, an innovation by the Lisbon Treaty is the 
inclusion among the objectives of the Union to ‘uphold and promote its values and 
interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens’ in its external relations (Art. 3(5) 
TEU). The failed Constitutional Treaty did not refer to the protection of citizens abroad as 
a general Union objective (Art. I-3(4) CT). This novelty was introduced by the French 
government at the Intergovernmental Conference of 2007 (de Poncins 2008: 75-76). The 
motivation behind this was, it has been argued, to underline that the Union is not a ‘Trojan 
horse’ of globalisation, but instead acts as a shield for its citizens from globalisation’s 
challenges and downsides (Sauron 2007: 30). Moreover, it could be seen as the 
constitutional concretization of the EU’s objective, introduced in Art. 2 of the Maastricht 
Treaty, ‘to assert its identity on the international scene’. One important aspect of this 
would be the external dimension of Union citizenship, i.e. also ‘to reinforce the identity of 
European citizens throughout the rest of the world’, as Ianniello Saliceti puts it, who states 
furthermore that this had been pursued already as early as 1985 by the ‘Adonnino 
Committee’ (2011: 92). 
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With the introduction and rapid development of the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (formerly ESDP), the European Union has equipped itself also with 
military capabilities that can be used to pursue its foreign policy (or ‘external action’, to use 
the post-Lisbon term).V The extent to which these capabilities can also be used to pursue 
the objective of protecting Union citizens abroad will be addressed here in the context of 
Operation Atalanta, the EU’s first naval military operation. Launched on 8 December 2008 
(Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP), it will continue at least till December 2012 (Council 
Decision 2010/766/CFSP, Art. 1(5)). The academic debate surrounding Atalanta has thus 
far focussed on issues pertaining to legal aspects of the detention and prosecution of 
pirates and/or Law of the Sea issues (Fischer-Lescano and Kreck 2009; Fink and Galvin 
2009: 384-385; Naert 2010: 179-191), or the geopolitical implications of the operation 
(Germond and Smith 2009; Kamerling and van der Putten 2010; Holmes 2010; Larik and 
Weiler 2011). However, it is argued here that the issue of protection of Union citizens 
should not be neglected, especially in view of both the unique (one might even say sui 
generis) nature of the concept of Union citizenship as well as of the EU as an actor in 
matters of international security. International organisations such as NATO do not contain 
any notion of common ‘citizenship’, whereas for individual countries it is a rather 
traditional and uncontroversial issue to protect their own nationals, who are bound by a 
‘genuine link’ to their state,VI abroad. For some it is even a constitutional objective 
(Ianniello Saliceti 2011: 97). Consequently, these peculiar features set the EU and 
Operation Atalanta apart from the other actors and their respective deployments in this 
theatre. Moreover, and in contrast to other CSDP/ESDP operations, Atalanta serves as a 
well-suited case study for the external protection of Union citizens. Whereas former 
missions were strictly concerned with external objectives that could only indirectly or 
incidentally affect the security of Union citizens, e.g. peace-keeping operations, police/rule 
of law missions or security sector reform programmes, Atalanta addresses pirate attacks in 
one of the most heavily-used maritime trade routes in the world, through which also large 
numbers of ships flying flags of EU Member States and EU citizens pass (Germond and 
Smith 2009: 587-589).  
It is against this backdrop that the novel civis europaeus encounters the re-surfacing 
hostis humani generis (as pirates were classically termed). Consequently, the question emerges 
whether Union citizens abroad can also trust here in the weight of the legal concept of civis 
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europaeus sum. Can they rely on the assets of Operation Atalanta, i.e. – to use Palmerston’s 
imagery – the ‘watchful eye’ and the ‘strong arm’ of the Union to protect them against the 
threat of pirate attacks? In order to approach this question, the paper will proceed as 
follows: Section 2 addresses the international law aspects of the of the external protection 
of citizens by forceful means; section 3 turns to the EU’s constitutional framework and the 
issue of using the CSDP to pursue the objective of protecting EU citizens aboard; section 4 
subsequently scrutinizes to which extent the mandate of Operation Atalanta takes this goal 
into account, observing that in spite of a constitutional objective the operation is not 
explicitly pursuing the protection of Union citizens. Section 5 points out the implications 
of this tension between the two. The paper concludes that the mandate of Atalanta, by 
focussing entirely on ‘universal’ objectives and neglecting the civis europaeus, is – if not 
unconstitutional – constitutionally incomplete. 
 
2. International law aspects  
The deployment of military forces and the use of force in order to protect a 
country’s citizens abroad raise first and foremost the question of legality under 
international law. For the EU the issue to use force for that purpose arises in the context of 
Atalanta with regard to crew members and passengers with Union citizenship who are 
threatened by pirates in the operation theatre.  
In view of the general prohibition imposed on states to use force ‘in their 
international relations’ under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, we have to 
address first the general parameters of international law in terms of the use of force to 
protect one’s citizens abroad. Even though International Law Commission (ICL) Special 
Rapporteur Dugard considered ‘[t]he use of force as the ultimate means of diplomatic 
protection’ in his 2000 report (International Law Commission 2000: para. 47; see also 
Gray, 2009: 136-137), this opinion cannot be regarded as the predominant one, and was 
not even shared by the majority of the ICL members (Gray 2009: 137). The current ILC 
commentary clearly states that ‘[t]he use of force [...] is not a permissible method for the 
enforcement of the right of diplomatic protection’ (International Law Commission 2006: 
27). Beyond the realm of diplomatic protection, international legal scholarship either 
discards any notion of forceful citizen protection as an exception to the prohibition to use 
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force (Bothe 2004: 604-605), or see merely little support in state practice and legal opinion 
for it (Gray 2008: 156-160).VII  
However, in the present case, we are not dealing with intervention on the territory 
of another state and/or against foreign state agents, but with pirate attacks – that is non-
state actors – on ships within the territorial waters of Somalia or on the high seas. This is, 
in the first place, regulated by the international Law of the Sea as codified in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The convention provides a 
definition of piracy (Art. 101 UNCLOS), and allows any state to seize pirate ships on the 
high seas, arrest the pirates and exercise jurisdiction over them (Art. 105 UNCLOS). 
Therefore, on the high seas, a state is allowed to use force against pirates without having to 
invoke any exceptional (and controversial) ‘right’ to protect its own citizens or to exercise a 
humanitarian intervention (Ronzitti 1985: 137). 
Importantly, in this particular case, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
has passed a number of resolutions addressing the piracy surge off the Coast of Somalia, 
which supplement, and in view of the supremacy of the UN Charter to other international 
agreements partly supplant (Art. 103 UN Charter), the UNCLOS framework. This 
concerns in particular United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008) of 2 June 
2008 (para. 7),VIII which authorizes states operating under this legal framework to use ‘all 
necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery’ (para. 7(b)), i.e. also to use 
force. Overall, in essence it makes ‘the rules of international law concerning piracy on the 
high seas applicable also to territorial waters’ of Somalia (Treves 2009: 404).IX  
The addition of the term ‘armed robbery’ to the UNCLOS-defined term ‘piracy’ is 
of some significance, as the latter notion might not always be applicable to modern forms 
of piracy (e.g. the requirement that always two ships must be involved). Treves points out 
that the former term is used in the context of the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) and supplements the notion of piracy, ‘inspired by the aim of including all acts 
connected with piracy (such as preparatory acts) and future possible acts involving only 
one ship’ (Treves 2009: 403). According to the IMO, ‘armed robbery’ is defined as  
‘any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, 
other than an act of “piracy” directed against a ship or against persons or property on 
board such a ship within a State’s jurisdiction over such offences.’ (International Maritime 
Organization 2011: Annex, para. 2.2.) 
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However, even though the Security Council is acting here under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia has to be notified of 
operations in its territorial waters (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008), 
para. 11),X which Naert calls ‘a simplified form of consent’ (Naert 2010: 185). While 
superfluous in view of the powers conferred upon the Security Council under Chapter VII, 
this could be seen as a supplementary invitation by Somalia for states to intervene in the 
fight against piracy in its territorial waters, which could serve to preclude illegality of the 
use of force as covered by such an invitation (Ronzitti 2007: 417). The EU has notified the 
TFG of Somalia accordingly (See Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP of 8 December 2008, 
point 4 of the grounds). 
One should distinguish here the use of force against pirates from that in a situation 
of armed conflict between states. As Treves puts it, in contrast to acts of self-defence, 
counter-piracy should ‘be assimilated to the exercise of the power to engage in police 
action on the high seas on foreign vessels which is permitted by exceptions to the rule 
affirming the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state’ (2009: 413). Similarly, but more 
accurately, Lubell calls for a ‘law enforcement approach of the scaled use of force’, which 
recognizes that even though we face here a force level below that of armed conflict, ‘[t]he 
level of force and types of weapons employed may well rise beyond the usual domestic 
crime scenarios’ (2010: 225). 
In view of the general authorization to combat piracy by the Law of the Sea and its 
extension ratione materiæ (‘armed robbery’) and loci (Somali territorial waters) through UN 
Security Council resolutions (and affirmed by TFG notifications), a state cannot be seen as 
violating another state’s rights or territorial integrity if it uses force against pirates off the 
coast of Somalia.XI There is no reason why this conclusion should change when the act of 
repressing piracy was carried out in a situation where the state’s own citizens were under 
threat. As was pointed out earlier, states do not have to invoke an exceptional right to 
protect their citizens to employ forceful measures against pirates. Hence, they can use these 
measures also to that particular end. As states are under no obligation, but are instead 
generally authorized to combat piracy, the protection by the (proportionate) use of force of 
a state’s nationals within these legal parameters is to be considered unobjectionable under 
international law.XII  
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As regards the special nature of the EU as an international actor, it follows from 
the foregoing that in any case its Member States would be allowed to use force against 
pirates within the particular legal framework concerning Somali piracy. Only in case of 
overstepping this framework and breaching international law would the question of 
responsibility between the Member States providing military assets to Atalanta and the EU 
itself arise. After all, the relevant Joint Action states that ‘[t]he European Union (EU) shall 
conduct a military operation […] called “Atalanta”’, not the several Member States 
(Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, Art. 1(1), emphasis added).  
Such questions of international responsibility of the EU notwithstanding (see Naert 
2010: 641-644), it seems clear that force by a Member State operating within Atalanta could 
be used to protect a Member State’s own citizens. There have been already a number of 
instances where EU Member States contemplated the use of force or actually resorted to 
forceful means to protect their citizens against pirates. According to French diplomatic 
sources, ‘[o]n three occasions French forces have had to intervene to protect French 
citizens taken hostage by pirates’. This concerned the vessels Le Ponant, Carré d’As and Tanit 
(Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations in New York 2009). In early May 
2009, a rescue operation by German commandos of the kidnapped freighter Hansa 
Stavanger anchored in a Somali harbour was narrowly aborted for security concerns (Spiegel 
2009).  
Furthermore, and crucially, this authorization under the international legal 
framework also covers the protection of non-nationals, which obviously makes sense 
seeing the often multinational setup of merchant ship crews and the general interest of the 
international community involved. These non-nationals could therefore also come from 
other EU Member States. A fitting example here is the rescue mission conducted by Dutch 
forces from the frigate Tromp operating in the framework of Atalanta, which also saved 
German nationals from pirates that had hijacked the MS Taipan in April 2010 (EU 
NAVOR Somalia 2010). This – at least in effect – amounts to an act of an EU Member 
State’s military forces protecting EU citizens from pirates. In view of the foregoing this is 
to be deemed legal under international law. The extent to which such protection of Union 
citizens is framed by EU law will be dealt with in the next two sections.  
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3. EU constitutional law aspects 
From the perspective of EU primary law, as was stated in the introduction, the 
Lisbon Treaty introduced among the objectives of the Union to ‘uphold and promote its 
values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens’ (Art. 3(5) TEU). From 
the emerging literature on the Union’s objectives as a category of constitutional law,XIII it 
can be concluded that these are binding obligations that commit the Union and its 
institutions to actively pursue these objectives within their areas of competence and that 
frame the use of their discretion accordingly (Calliess 2003: 90-93; Ruffert 2011: 41-44; 
Reimer 2003: 1000-1007; Kotzur 2005: 314-315; Plecher-Hochstraßer 2006: 105-136; 
Sommermann 1997: 280-296; Ipsen 1972: 556-563). In this literature, there is general 
agreement that also the Members States are bound, albeit indirectly, by these objectives by 
virtue of the duty of cooperation (Art. 4(3) TEU). Of course external relations, and in 
particular the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), of which the CSDP is 
a component, have certain special characteristics (intergovernmentalism and very limited of 
jurisdiction of the ECJ, see Art. 24 TEU; and Thym 2010: 330-338; van Elsuwege 2010). 
However, there are no cogent reasons to suggest that external action-related objectives 
should be treated in a fundamentally different way from internal policy-related objectives 
(Larik 2011).  
How, then, do the objectives of upholding and promoting the Union’s values and 
interests and contributing to the protection of its citizens abroad apply to the piracy surge 
off the Coast of Somalia? As far as the (economic) interests are concerned, the stakes for 
the EU are obvious. The strategic economic importance for the EU lies in the fact that the 
Gulf of Aden is a maritime chokepoint through which 90 percent of merchandise and 30 
percent of the energy resources consumed in Europe pass (French Ministry of Defence 
2010; also Larik and Weiler: 85-86). Therefore, as French vice-admiral Bruno Nielly puts it, 
‘il n'est pas question pour l'Europe de laisser ne serait-ce qu'un tronçon de cette route 
menacé par un phénomène tel que la piraterie’ and that ‘[l]'Europe, d'abord, y défend ses 
intérêts’ (French Ministry of Defence 2010). Also Germond calls Operation Atalanta ‘the 
first ever ESDP operation that primarily aims at defending Member States’ interests (that 
is, providing security to their merchant shipping)’ (2010: 53).XIV In addition, Europe’s 
fishing industry should not remain unaddressed, which has been very active in the area and 
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has been criticized frequently for taking advantage of the lack of effective state power in 
Somalia (Phillips 2009; and generally on illegal fishing Lehr and Lehmann 2007: 12-13). 
Apart from the economic, there are also wider security concerns such as the pirates 
collaborating with terrorist groups, and of course the protection of EU citizens (Germond 
and Smith 2009: 580-581), a matter to which we will return in detail. Therefore, Atalanta 
can definitely be seen as a measure in the pursuit of the Union’s interests. 
One could also argue that the EU’s approach in Atalanta is framed to safeguard and 
promote its values. Examples for this would be the integrated approach that also aims at 
improving the situation in Somalia itself (above all through the EU Training Mission in 
Somalia, Council Decision 2010/197/CFSP), even though the effectiveness of this 
‘comprehensive approach’ can be questioned (Sanchez Barrueco 2009). With particular 
regard to the treatment of captured pirates, safeguard mechanisms to protect their human 
rights stand out. A prominent illustration of this is that the EU ensures that they will not 
be subject to the death penalty when tried in third countries (Council Joint Action 
2008/851/CFSP, Art. 12(2)). Also multilateral cooperation among the different actors in 
the region is to be fostered, which, too, can be seen as expressions of European values.XV 
But what about the potential contribution of Atalanta to the protection of Union 
citizens, as an objective that is stipulated explicitly next to values and interests, i.e. an 
objective in its own right? Here, first of all the question needs to be answered whether, and 
to which extent, the CFSP/CSDP can be used to this specific end. As is also generally 
agreed concerning constitutionally-codified objectives, they do not as such establish 
competence (Reimer 2003: 995-996; Calliess 2003: 89-90; Kotzur 2005: 314). Given that 
the EU remains an entity based on conferred powers (Art. 5(1) TEU), the competence to 
pursue a Union objective and the procedures to be followed ought to be specified 
elsewhere in the primary law (Art. 3(6) TEU). 
As a preliminary observation, the objective of citizen protection abroad is not 
explicitly reiterated or linked to competences and procedures in Title V of the TEU or Part 
Five of the TFEU on external action. With particular regard to the objectives of the CFSP, 
Art. 23 TEU states that the Union’s international action ‘shall be guided by the principles, 
shall pursue the objectives of, and be conducted in accordance with, the general provisions 
laid down in Chapter 1’. However, Arts. 21 and 22 TEU, which make up this chapter, do 
not include a specific reference to the protection of citizens. What is made explicit 
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elsewhere is the right of Union citizens ‘to protection by the diplomatic or consular 
authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of that State’ in 
third countries in which their Member State of nationality is not represented (Art. 23 
TFEU; also Art. 46 Charter of Fundamental Rights). This provision is situated under the 
heading ‘Non-discrimination and Citizenship’ in the TFEU. This raises the question 
whether the objective of citizen protection abroad is only to be pursued through 
diplomatic or consular protection as an external aspect of citizenship and, a contrario, not 
through the CFSP/CSDP. 
This would seem too narrow an interpretation. The scope of the CFSP is very 
broad, as Art. 24(1) states that ‘[t]he Union’s competence in matters of common foreign 
and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the 
Union’s security’.XVI Also, despite the lack of explicit reference to citizen protection there, 
the general Union objectives found in Art. 3(5) TEU are to guide our interpretation of, and 
need to be ‘read together’ with, the more specific objectives and provisions that follow in 
the Treaties (Lenaerts and Van Nuffel 2011: 111; Callies 2003: 91-92; Ipsen 1972: 558). 
Therefore, the protection of citizens can be regarded as implied under the Union’s 
‘fundamental interests’ and ‘security’, which are to be safeguarded under Art. 21(2)(a) 
through EU external action. Thus, the Union can be deemed generally competent to 
protect its citizens abroad, including through the CFSP. Of course, this competence, as 
part of the CFSP, would be of a strictly non-exclusive kind incapable of inhibiting Member 
States’ own respective competence to protect their nationals abroad (Art. 2(4) TFEU; 
Eeckhout 2011: 171). 
Turning now to the CSDP proper, Art. 42(1) TEU provides that ‘[t]he common 
security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security 
policy’. However, citizen protection is not explicitly mentioned here either, as civilian and 
military capabilities may be used by the Union ‘on missions outside the Union for peace-
keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter’ (Art. 41(1) TEU). That would not as such seem 
to include the protection of citizens.  
However, the more precise enumeration of the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’ in Art. 
43(1) TEU ‘include[s]’, inter alia, ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks’. Even though Union 
citizens are not mentioned, the notion of ‘rescue tasks’ can only reasonably be understood 
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as referring also to rescue efforts of one’s own citizens. This view finds confirmation when 
looking at the background of this provision. In the original 1992 Petersberg declaration of 
the Western European Union (WEU), the French version referred to ‘des missions 
humanitaires ou d'évacuation de ressortissants’ (Western European Union 1992: 7, emphasis 
added). This reference reappeared in a more recent factsheet of the now defunct WEU, 
which stated that ‘Battlegroups can be used for the full range of missions and tasks listed in 
Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union (Petersberg missions)’ including, importantly, 
‘the evacuation of EU citizens’ (European Security and Defence Assembly/Assembly of 
WEU 2009, emphasis added). The later omission of this reference to citizens in the 
Amsterdam Treaty has been interpreted as intending to not a priori exclude third-country 
nationals from being rescued through EU missions (von Kielmansegg 2007: 632; d’Argent 
1998: 391). Any other interpretation would seem to be at odds with the rather wide scope 
of the CSDP. According to Coelmont (2008: 6), ‘apart from collective defence, all kinds of 
military operations one can at present realistically invent in our global world can all be 
undertaken in a European context as an ESDP (or CSDP) operation.’ Moreover, given the 
prominent place of the protection of citizens among the general objectives of the Union, a 
systematic-teleological interpretation of the Treaties would favour the pursuit of this 
objective by the entire spectrum of external EU policies and capabilities, including those of 
the CSDP.  
Of course, competence to pursue this objective through the CSDP does not 
dispense of the legal limitations of EU law and international law that will have to be 
respected in doing so. For instance, a rescue operation of EU citizens from pirates, just like 
any general anti-piracy action, must respect basic legal principles such as necessity and 
proportionality, and respect the rights of third parties (e.g. the sovereign rights of third 
states into whose territorial waters/territory EU citizens may be abducted by pirates and 
the parameters set by the UN Security Council). 
Consequently, the preliminary conclusion is that the EU legal order allows the 
Union to use the CSDP and the assets of the Member States to pursue the objective of 
protecting its citizens. Furthermore, as was concluded earlier, the international legal regime 
in place also authorizes the use of force to that end (n.b. for counter-piracy in general, 
which includes but is not limited to citizen protection).  
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The additional question arises, then, whether the EU and its Member States are also 
under a stricter obligation in this regard. In particular, is there a right of EU citizens to be 
protected against pirates by the Union? What exists thus far – at most – is the right of EU 
citizens to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of EU Member States in 
case their Member State of nationality is not represented in a third country.XVII 
Legislatively, this has been elaborated upon by Decision 95/553/EC on the protection for 
citizens of the European Union by diplomatic and consular representations. But given the 
succinctness of the law in this regard it is certainly correct to say that ‘the acquis relating to 
the protection of EU citizens is not well developed’ (Ianniello Saliceti 2011: 97; referring 
also to European Commission 2006). In any event, the reference to ‘third countries’ would 
imply that situations on the high seas are not included, nor would be the protection by 
naval forces as opposed to ‘diplomatic or consular authorities’. Curiously enough though, 
Ianniello Saliceti discusses in this context the example of an evacuation operation from an 
area of crisis involving ‘rescue aircraft’ (Ianniello Saliceti 2011: 97). It is doubtful whether 
the notion of consular and diplomatic protection could be stretched thus far. At least the 
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection or the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations do not include this particular type of action,XVIII and, a 
fortiori it would appear, acts by military forces on the high seas. At best, chartered civilian 
aircraft might be considered. Therefore, it can be concluded that any rights under EU law 
in terms of the forceful protection of citizens abroad by military means do not exist. In 
addition, procedurally there is no forum to invoke such rights directly vis-à-vis the EU in 
view of the exclusion of jurisdiction of the ECJ from most of the CFSP (Art. 24(1) TEU 
and Art. 275 TFEU).XIX 
 
4. The operational mandate 
Having considered the EU’s constitutional framework, let us now turn to the 
mandate proper of Operation Atalanta, and see to which extent it lives up to the objective 
of protecting Union citizens. The mandate and operational parameters of are set out in 
Joint Action 2008/851. Art. 1(1) of the Joint Action characterizes the mission as  
‘a military operation in support of Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008) of 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in a manner consistent with action permitted 
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with respect to piracy under Article 100 et seq. of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea signed in Montego Bay on 10 December 1982 […] and by means, in 
particular, of commitments made with third States […].’ (Council Joint Action 
2008/851/CFSP, Art. 1(1)) 
Art. 1 then proceeds to set out the operation’s basic objectives, of which there were 
initially two: First, protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering 
food aid to displaced persons in Somalia, in accordance with the mandate laid down in UN 
Security Council Resolution 1814 (2008); secondly, the protection of vulnerable vessels and 
the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the 
Somali coast, in accordance with the mandate laid down in UN Security Council 
Resolution 1816 (2008) (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, Art. 1(1)). A third objective 
was introduced on 8 December 2009 by amending Art. 1 of the Joint Action, stating that 
‘[i]n addition, Atalanta shall contribute to the monitoring of fishing activities off the coast 
of Somalia.’XX This can be seen as showing awareness of the controversial fishing activities 
by European vessels and the intention to make clear that Atalanta is not there to act as a 
military shield for the illegal exploitation of Somalia’s maritime resources. 
Art. 2 of the Joint Action subsequently provides the specific objectives in the actual 
operational mandate. Essentially, Atalanta shall ‘as far as available capabilities allow’, 
provide protection to WFP vessels (including by placing armed units on board); provide 
protection of merchant vessels ‘based on a case-by-case evaluation of needs’; take the 
‘necessary measures’, i.e. also the use of force, to combat acts of piracy and armed robbery; 
detain and transfer piracy suspects for prosecution; ‘liaise and cooperate’ with other 
relevant actors in the theatre; and, at a later stage, lend assistance to Somali authorities ‘by 
making available data relating to fishing activities compiled in the course of the 
operation’.XXI 
A specific reference to the protection of Union citizens in the mandate is missing. 
It is clearly tied to the international legal framework, above all the relevant United Nations 
Security Council resolutions and the Law of the Sea. Especially the formulation of the 
mission as one ‘in support of’ UN Security Council resolutions suggests that Operation 
Atalanta functions as an executing arm of the Security Council. The EU is thereby – as the 
TEU puts it – contributing to ‘multilateral solutions to common problems’ (Art. 21(1), 
second subpara. TEU) by addressing a threat to international peace and security. 
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Consequently, it is to this universal end that it protects WFP ships, secures maritime traffic 
and pursues pirates.  
Among the ships that are to be protected, WFP vessels enjoy priority. They are not 
only mentioned first, but are also given the express possibility to have armed units put on 
board. Most important, however, is the absence of a reference to ‘a case-by-case evaluation 
of needs’, which applies to merchant vessels. Among the merchant vessels, no distinction is 
made between ships sailing under EU Member State flags or those with Union citizens on 
board and the rest. The presentation of the operation by the Council to the public further 
highlights this prioritization. Features like the ‘food count’ tables used on the factsheets 
about the operation, informing us that between the launch of the operation and the end of 
2010 about 490000 tons of food have been delivered and ‘on average, more than 1600000’ 
Somalis have been fed each day (Council of the European Union 2011: 2), foster the 
impression that this mission is of a primarily, if not exclusively, humanitarian character. A 
similar ‘EU citizens rescued’ count is nowhere to be found.  
 
5. A mismatch of  objectives? 
The question now arises as to the relationship between the operational mandate 
and its specific objectives on the one, and the constitutional objectives of the EU Treaties 
on the other hand, and how they each frame the discretion of the EU forces assigned to 
Operation Atalanta. Even though, as was concluded earlier, there exist neither court 
jurisdiction nor individual rights here, objectives are still legally binding and serve as a 
normative framework for the actors called upon to pursue them.  
At this point, it is worth drawing an analogy from Ianniello Saliceti’s example for 
the application of the principle of non-discrimination in the context of an evacuation 
operation of EU citizens (see supra section 3). He suggests that non-discrimination in such 
a case requires to ‘take onboard an equal number of distressed EU citizens of each 
nationality’ in a rescue operation by aircraft (Ianniello Saliceti 2011: 97).XXII In this example, 
it seems to be implied that first EU citizens would have to be rescued, leaving only any 
potential spare seats for third country nationals. Even though it is difficult to agree with 
such a strict application of equality among EU citizens, it reveals nonetheless the assumption 
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that the objective of citizen protection frames the discretion of the actors in a particular 
situation.  
Let us assume then a situation in which an Atalanta warship receives distress calls 
from several vessels being attacked by pirates. On one ship, there are a number of EU 
citizens present, on the others not. There are no other military capabilities available. For 
the warship, the distance to the distressed ships is about the same, and given time 
constraints, only one ship can be helped, leaving the others at the mercy of the pirates. It is 
a hypothetical example, but given the vastness of the area covered and the relatively little 
number of warships available,XXIII it is not entirely far-fetched. In such a situation, 
depending on the features of the other ships, the mandate of Atalanta and the objectives of 
Art. 3(5) TEU, in particular with regard to the protection of citizens, might be at odds.  
As was pointed out, the mandate of Joint Action 2008/851 prioritizes WFP ships, 
and provides as criterion to choose among merchant vessels a case-by-case evaluation of 
need. Thus, assuming there was a WFP ship among the distressed vessels, the operational 
mandate would unequivocally point to the WFP ship to be rescued, abandoning the EU 
citizens on the other ship to their fate. The general objectives of the Union, however, 
explicitly emphasize the protection of citizens in the EU’s external action. This shifts the 
balance, if not towards favouring the ship with EU citizens onboard, at least to a less clear-
cut priority structure. The result is a (also morally difficult) choice between either 
promoting the universal/altruistic value of ensuring the flow of humanitarian aid to the 
suffering population of Somalia or pursuing the self-interested objective of protecting one’s 
own citizens.  
What if, alternatively, the choice was between a cargo ship (with no crew members 
who are EU citizens) and a yacht with EU citizens? The mandate’s case-by-case criterion is 
of little use here, as the need is equal in this example. Consequently, the mandate gives no 
further guidance, leaving it up to the commander of the warship to decide.XXIV Art. 3(5) 
TEU, in turn, frames it as a choice between safeguarding the EU’s interest in safe maritime 
trade by helping the cargo vessel and contributing to citizen protection by helping the 
yacht. Though it is as such also an open choice, the explicit reference to citizens as 
opposed to the wide notion of ‘interest’ might tilt the balance towards EU citizens. 
Arguably, for a nation-state, the choice to give priority to its own citizens in both 
cases would not be objectionable. Universal and economic objectives are not to be 
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discounted, but in this particular case they could not be served in view of the imperative of 
protecting one’s own nationals first. Charity, so to say, begins at home. As Bowett points 
out (1986: 45), states ‘will be placed under extreme political pressure to act to protect the 
safety of their nationals abroad’ and cannot ‘lightly refuse such protection when it lies 
within [their] powers to afford it’. Hence, one could imagine the domestic political outrage 
for a case in which the national military failed to prevent the kidnapping of nationals by 
pirates when it had the chance to do so. In the EU context, however, this is a more delicate 
matter. From a Member State perspective, helping another Member State’s nationals is at 
the outset an act of altruism (e.g. the Dutch navy rescuing the German crew from the MS 
Taipan). But the fact that both of them are EU Member States with loyalty obligations 
towards the Union, and by virtue of the over-arching concept of Union citizenship, it 
becomes a self-serving act from the perspective of the outside, non-EU world.XXV 
How can this tension between the Joint Action and Art. 3(5) TEU be resolved? 
Even though CFSP/CSDP acts are not qualified as ‘legislative acts’ (Art. 24(1), second 
subpara. TEU), they are binding and the primacy of the primary law as lex superior applies 
(on the legal nature of CFSP acts and the hierarchy of norms see Wessel 1999: 198-204; 
Gosalbo Bono 2006: 341-47). The introduction of Union objectives of general application 
(Art. 3 TEU) by the Lisbon reform bolsters this conclusion. This means that in the absence 
of a clear conflict, the secondary instrument, i.e. the Joint Action here, must be interpreted 
in conformity with the primary law. Hence, the objectives of the operation as set out in the 
mandate cannot be interpreted in such a way that the pursuit of any of the constitutional 
objectives as set out in Art. 3(5) TEU is undercut. Thus, Operation Atalanta’s mandate is 
not to be construed as neglecting the protection of Union citizens altogether. Given its 
total absence from the mandate, there is in any event potential for disorientation or 
misunderstanding in critical situations where clear guidance from the legal framework 
would be highly desirable. 
One may think about plausible reasons for the conspicuous absence of citizen 
protection in the mandate. One possible explanation may be the participation of third 
countries in the operation. To date, Norway, Croatia, Ukraine and Montenegro have 
contributed to Atalanta (Council of the European Union 2011: 2; see also e.g. Council 
Decision 2010/199/CFSP). Therefore, one might consider it inappropriate to mandate 
these countries to help protect EU citizens. Here, the same logic applies: It would 
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challenge the priority of protecting their own nationals (or interests) by committing 
themselves to Atalanta. Then again, it would not be inconceivable to simply add the 
protection of citizens of participating countries to the mandate as well. As we have seen, 
the ‘Petersberg task’ of rescue operations in Art. 43(1) TEU is deliberately left open to 
rescuing third-country nationals as well. 
Another reason might be the political sensitivity of European countries regarding 
the issue of using military force to save their own nationals (and, a fortiori, other EU 
citizens). Therefore, the emphasis is put on the multilateral framework and universal 
objectives. Germany would be at the forefront of such considerations. It should be recalled 
that Federal President Köhler resigned from office in mid-2010 following protracted 
criticism for a statement that for a country like Germany, it might be necessary to also 
defend its interests such as free trade routes by force (for a reproduction of the original 
quote see Mandalka 2010). Subsequently, Foreign Minister Westerwelle tried to clarify 
Germany’s stance in a speech before the Bundestag on Operation Atalanta in November 
2010. Regarding the protection of national interests (Interessenwahrnehmung) he underlined 
that the entire operation had as its rationale the guarantee of delivery of humanitarian aid, 
and only as a secondary goal there was also the protection of international maritime traffic 
(German Foreign Office 2010). As he put it, ‘foreign policy that is committed to 
humanitarian values can, may, even must also take into account one’s own interests.’XXVI 
However, he then softened this reference to the ‘own interests’ by stating that freedom of 
movement on the high seas is a common interest of the international community and that 
Germany was acting under a mandate of the UNSC (German Foreign Office 2010). While 
we see here that the pursuit of the national interest is still a contentious issue, the 
protection of citizens did not figure as controversial in the discussion. It was rather the 
tension between economic and universal humanitarian considerations. As was mentioned 
earlier, the German government had planned and only narrowly avoided carrying out an 
operation of German special forces to rescue the partly German crew of the kidnapped 
container ship Hansa Stavanger.XXVII 
In other Member States, such controversies do not seem to arise at all either. The 
Swedish foreign ministry, for instance, also puts the protection of WFP ships first, whereas 
the presence of naval forces ‘is also seen to make it easier for merchant shipping in the 
area, including vessels that fly the Swedish flag and that sail in the area’ (Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs of Sweden  2010). Here, the protection of Swedish ships serves as an 
indirect motivation. More explicit is the Spanish government’s stance. The ministry of 
defence points out that ‘the problem of piracy represented not just a threat to international 
maritime security, but also to national interests in the area, represented by the fishing 
activities of the Spanish tuna fleet in the Indian Ocean.’XXVIII For the Spanish government, 
the protection of Spanish vessels and fishermen and WFP ships appear side by side as 
motivation for sending warships to that area (Spanish Ministry of Defence 2010). As was 
mentioned earlier, the French already have a history of using force to rescue their nationals 
from pirates captured by Somali pirates.  
Thus, neither third country participation nor political sensitivity seem to explain the 
absence of citizen protection from the mandate of Atalanta in a plausible way. To the 
contrary, a look at the national stances of EU Member States rather indicates that the 
forceful protection of nationals is not controversial. But this equally shows that citizen 
protection, especially in the realm of security policy, is still seen from a strictly national 
viewpoint, which remains thus far unaffected by the concept of ‘Union citizenship’. The 
elevation of the protection of EU citizens abroad to a constitutional objective of the Union 
does not seem to have altered this. Illustrative is here again the example mentioned at the 
outset, i.e. the rescue of German crew members of the hijacked MS Taipan by Dutch 
troops from the frigate HNLMS Tromp operating in the framework of Atalanta. Not even 
the Operation itself regarded this as an act of protecting EU citizens by CSDP assets. 
Instead, the press release by Atalanta on the successful rescue operation limited itself to 
stating that ‘EU NAVFOR HNLMS Tromp retakes pirated MV Taipan’, thus identifying 
the warship as part of the EU operation (EU NAVFOR Somalia 2010). Also in the 
national media of both countries it was not portrayed in a European perspective (NRC 
Handelsblad 2010; Spiegel 2010). Especially telling was the angle taken by an Associated 
Press reporter who subtitled his article on the incident: ‘Dutch marines sidestep EU 
bureaucracy to rescue German container ship from Somali pirates’ (Corder 2010). From 
this viewpoint, the EU does not appear as the actor or even facilitator for the Member 
States to act, but as an obstacle to achieving the goal of mutual protection of nationals. 
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6. Conclusion: Civis europaeus in foro interno, externo barbarus 
The discussion of this encounter between the civis europaeus and the hostis humani 
generis off the coast of Somali yields the following observations. First, in this particular 
setting, international law allows the protection by the use of force of victims of piracy by 
virtue of the Law of the Sea and the special regime imposed by the UN Security Council. 
Within this particular framework, states are allowed to use force also for the purpose of 
protecting their own citizens from pirates. Secondly, the concept of ‘Union citizenship’ 
gives us a new perspective to look at the challenge for the Member States to protect jointly 
their citizens abroad. The altruistic objective of protecting a foreigner is transformed into 
the Union’s constitutionally entrenched self-interest to protect its own citizens. Union 
citizenship has now an explicit external dimension, which goes beyond diplomatic and 
consular assistance, and indeed also extends to the CFSP/CSDP. Thirdly, the mandate of 
Operation Atalanta clearly prioritizes the pursuit of universal objectives, above all the 
protection of WFP ships, and otherwise lumps together all merchant ships, making no 
reference to Union citizens at all. Therefore, fourthly, while the notion of EU citizenship 
looms large in the primary law and in the Union’s internal sphere, it is conspicuously 
absent in the implementing acts of the operation. This creates tension which in extreme 
situations can lead to putting the protection of Union citizens in the back seat. Whereas 
this would be politically highly controversial in a national setting, the salience of this issue 
appears not to have surfaced at the Union level. 
In view of these observations, it can be concluded that there is a widening gap 
between the powerful notion of Union citizenship within the Union and its present 
weakness outside of it. Internally, the development of Union law makes it increasingly 
difficult to construe nationals from different Member States as proper ‘foreigners’. The 
phrase civis europaeus sum carries weight in foro interno. Externally, we see that the cives europaei 
might receive consular assistance in case, for instance, they get jailed, are hospitalized or 
lose their passport. However, in the face of pirate attacks in the troubled waters off the 
Somali coast, civis europaeus sum remains thus far a call that falls on deaf ears. 
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